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1. THE NATURE OF CAPITAL FLOWS IN THE 1990s 
As witnessed  by Mexico and Argentina in 1995 and by the Southern Cone 
countries of Latin America in the early 1980s, the macroeconomic adjustment to a 
sudden reversal of foreign capital  flows can be extremely painful. There are at least 
four major reasons why governments and central banks should care about the 
sustainability of the capital flows which their economies can tap abroad: 
  • First, international capital markets are highly imperfect due to enforcement 
problems and information asymmetries. Trade in financial assets, unlike trade 
in goods, is incomplete and intertemporal, based on promises to pay in the 
future. The time lag between financial transaction and contract completion, 
coupled with incomplete insurance markets and other distortions, can generate 
abrupt and destabilising market corrections. Financial markets often do not 
discipline the recipient countries when the latter do not face an upward supply 
curve for foreign capital but rather face a horizontal supply curve due to 
currency  appreciation and falling spreads charged by lenders, until capital 
rationing sets in [Devlin et al. (1994)] . 
  • Second, any shortfall in capital inflows will require immediate cutbacks in 
domestic absorption to restore external balance. The savings-investment 
balance is more likely to be achieved through cuts in investment than through 
higher savings in the short term, compromising future output levels. Current 
output levels fall to the extent that rigidities prevent  resource reallocation 
[Devlin et al. (1994)], so that contractionary disabsorption effects outweigh 
expansionary substitution effects. 
  • Third, the expansion of domestic credit connected with unsterilised capital 
inflows may not be sound enough to stand the rise in domestic interest rates 
and the fall in domestic asset prices that go with a reversal of these inflows 
[Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod (1994)].  The resulting breakdown of domestic 
financial institutions provides incentives for monetary expansion and fiscal  
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    deficits incurred by the public bail-out of ailing banks. 
  • Fourth,  temporary capital flows may lead to an unsustainable appreciation in 
the real exchange rate. The appreciation is in conflict with development 
strategies based on the expansion of exports and efficient import substitution, 
which centrally relies on a reliable and competitive exchange rate. Temporary 
appreciation causes sub-optimal investments, which are costly to reverse, and 
undermines active trade promotion, export diversification, and productivity 
growth and breeds capital flight [Fischer and Reisen (1993)].  Large swings in 
real exchange rates, often a result of temporary capital flows, have been found 
to significantly depress machinery and equipment investment, and thus long-
run growth performance [Agosin (1994)]. 
The precarious  data base of capital flows, as well as the fact that capital 
flows are fungible, highly substitutable, and endogenous with respect to external 
shocks and internal policies, make it difficult to measure their  “temperature” 
[Claessens et al. (1995)].  With respect to the inflows to Latin America, Calvo et al. 
(1993) early on pointed to their cyclical character, while Reisen (1993) has stressed 
their temporary nature by pointing to the completion of privatisation, the one-time 
repatriation of flight capital, to short-term maturities, and to exchange rate–based 
disinflation in the region. Others, like Dornbusch (1992), held that the flows were 
not hot money at all but lukewarm-to-cool–money to stay, such as foreign direct 
investment–and that the share of cool money would go on rising. Nunnenkamp 
(1993) argued that the structure of capital inflows to Latin America resembled 
closely those of East Asia (an observation not confirmed by Table 1) and that the 
reversibility of capital inflows was linked to country-specific policy performance. 
Such interpretation of the origins and permanence would exclude any major role for 
policy intervention, since the revival of capital flows would be home-made and any 
reversal would be due to policy slippages. Subsequent econometric studies 
[reviewed in IMF (1994)] have contradicted such optimistic interpretation. These 
studies suggest that cyclical external factors accounted for some 30 to 50 percent of 
the variation in capital flows to developing countries, playing a greater role in Latin 
America than in Asia.  The implicit warning that these studies carry, namely, that a 
rise in OECD-country interest rates would lead to a halt or even a reversal of capital 
flows, was partly confirmed by the $40 billion reserve loss of Mexico during 1994 
and by net outflows from dedicated emerging market funds during 1994. 
For industrialised countries, Turner (1991) recently examined the volatility of 
different capital-account items in order to arrive at a distinction between the 
permanent versus temporary and the autonomous versus accommodating flows. For 
the period 1975-1989, the capital flows that were most closely correlated with 
financing requirements were classified as the most accommodating, and the most  
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accommodating types of capital flows closely corresponded to the most temporary 
flows, proxied by their standardised variability (coefficient of variation) over the 
period 1975-1988.  Finally, Turner made a ranking of four capital-account items, 
ranging from the most autonomous and permanent to the most accommodating and 
temporary (i.e., volatile)  flows:  (i) long-term bank lending; (ii) foreign direct 
investment;  (iii) portfolio investment; and (iv) short-term bank flows. 
A closer inspection of different capital-account items tends to confirm 
Turner’s results: 
• Long-term bank lending includes essentially syndicated Euro-loans, amounting 
to more than $200 billion in 1994. The OECD (1995) reports the average 
maturity of the recorded Euro-credits.  A striking observation is that the 
average maturity on these syndicated loans to borrowers from the OECD 
countries is shorter than to borrowers from the developing countries. During 
the 1990s, the average maturity for the OECD borrowers has oscillated 
between 5 and 6 years, while borrowers from the developing countries enjoyed 
average maturities of between 6 and 9 years. The longer maturities for 
developing country borrowers are explained by the high proportion of long-
term project loans in syndicated lending. 
• Foreign direct investment–particularly welcomed by developing countries for 
giving access to state-of-the-art technology, increasing the scope for export 
growth, and promoting competition in the host country–is largely determined 
by non-cyclical considerations.  Being rather governed by long-term 
profitability-expectations, it is less subject to sudden shifts in investor 
sentiment. While on an annual basis, large fluctuations of foreign-direct-
investment flows are regularly observed, foreign-direct-investment stocks are 
largely illiquid and irreversible. Foreign direct investment, which is little 
dependent on financial market sentiment, has bad-weather qualities. 
• Portfolio investment is a mixed bag with respect to its stability. Investment by 
pension funds and life insurance companies can be taken as long-term 
investment, since these funds follow a buy-and-hold strategy rather than a 
trading strategy in the emerging stock markets.  Unlike banks and most other 
investors, pension funds and life insurers benefit from regular inflows of funds 
on a contractual basis and from long-term liabilities (with no premature 
withdrawal of funds), which together imply little liquidity risk [Davis (1995)]. 
As long as these funds are underinvested in the emerging stock markets (as 
measured by their percentage share in world stock market capitalisation) and as 
long as the emerging stock markets display a comparatively low return 
correlation vis-à-vis the OECD stock markets,  developing countries can expect 
further equity-related capital flows from pension funds and life insurers 




[Fischer and Reisen (1995)]. In order to tap these flows, developing countries 
must strive for investment grading by the major credit-rating agencies. 
• Equity-related investments by domestic residents with overseas holdings, by 
private foreign investors, and from managed funds (country funds and mutual 
funds) are largely governed by cyclical determinants and oriented at short-term 
returns. In the course of the early 1990s, the decline in returns on riskless 
assets in the US and other OECD countries has led, not to an acceptance of 
falling returns, but to a growing tolerance of risk. Mainly via mutual funds, this 
has brought much speculative money to the emerging stock markets. The 
mutual funds have to publish regular (by now, even daily)  asset prices and can 
suffer large redemptions at any time when there is bad news.  Chart 1, 
displaying net flows and asset prices for seven funds dedicated to emerging 
stock markets, underlines their volatility. What is more, with the need to have 
sufficient cash to pay off clients redeeming their holdings, a widespread crisis, 
such as the one that developed after the devaluation of the Mexican Peso in late 
1994, forces fund managers to sell in markets totally unrelated to the origin of 
the crisis. 
• Any other portfolio investment, in particular the bond-related, should be 
considered as volatile. Borrowing through corporate or government bonds, the 
most important component of Latin American capital inflows in the 1990s (see 
below), is largely governed by interest rate differentials and is, thus, akin to 
reversal. The average maturity of Latin American international bonds has 
fallen below 4 years during the 1990s so that a large part of the outstanding 
bonds can be fairly rapidly withdrawn; moreover, a concerted response to 
sustain external financing is difficult to organise as claims are dispersed among 
numerous bond holders [Griffith-Jones (1994)]. 
• Short-term bank lending and borrowing facilities (such as Euro medium-term 
notes and Euro-commercial paper) are particularly cyclical and volatile. Any 
developing country interested in sustained growth should be wary whenever 
firms and banks incur these borrowings. 
2. THE 1990s CAPITAL FLOWS: ASIA AND 
    LATIN AMERICA IN PERSPECTIVE 
Putting the 1990s surge of capital flows into a broad regional perspective may 
be useful for two reasons: First, Asia and Latin America compete in international 
capital markets, and second, Asia (ex-Philippines) may offer valuable policy lessons 
to Latin America (ex-Chile). However, country policies and experiences vary within 
the two regions, requiring to supplement the regional perspective with a more 
country-specific analysis. 
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Table 1 
Two Episodes of High Capital Flows, 
Asia and Latin America Annual Average 
             1978-82            1990-93 




Gross Capital Inflows, bn $ 
    of which ( percent ) 
19.3 36.5  74.7  36.7 
     –  FDI  15.0  15.1  37.1  33.5 
    –  Portfolio 3.6  4.9  14.2  68.1 
     –  Other “Long-term”  53.9  63.6  21.7  –32.1 
     –  Other “Short-term”  27.5  16.4  27.0  30.5 
Net Capital Inflows, bn $  15.8  26.3  46.6  23.8 
Reserve Accumulation  6.9  0.6  31.0  18.0 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 1994; own calculations. 
Many observers have been drawn to an overly optimistic interpretation of the 
capital flows of the early 1990s by some regularities between Asia and Latin 
America and by some differences to the flows that preceded the debt troubles of the 
1980s. Unlike in the 1980s, capital flows were not pulled in by deficit-running 
government budgets and public enterprises, but essentially by private investors and 
private firms. Unlike the 1980s, when bank lending prevailed in both regions, risk 
capital has been flowing to both regions as portfolio and direct investment. As a 
share of gross capital flows, FDI rose from 15 percent during 1978-82 to 35 percent 
during 1990-93 in both regions (see Table 1). Another similarity between both 
regions is the size of net capital flows in terms of their gross domestic product and 
the high percentage share of these net flows that have gone into foreign exchange 
reserves. But beneath the surface, some important differences loom large for the 
composition and sources of capital flows: 
• First, although the share of FDI in gross capital inflow is only slightly higher in 
Asia than in Latin America, its nature differs between the two regions. In Latin 
America it has mainly taken the form of debt/equity swaps and privatisation, 
which do not necessarily generate additional capital formation. In Asia, by 
contrast, foreign direct investment has mostly been in the form of acquisitions 
or the setting-up of new enterprises [BIS, (1994)]. The different composition of  




  FDI may determine its macro economic consequences:  in Asia it is more 
likely to add to domestic investment and it is also more likely to be skewed 
towards export production (rather than construction of shopping malls, for 
example) than in Latin America. 
• Second, the share and the nature of portfolio flows differ markedly between 
the Asian and Latin American capital accounts. In Asia, portfolio flows 
accounted for just 14.2 percent of gross capital inflows, compared with a 
corresponding percentage share of 68.1 percent in Latin America. Round three-
quarters of portfolio investment to Latin America were borrowings in 
international capital markets, while only a quarter consisted of equity-related 
flows [Group of Thirty (1994)]. Not only is the equity-related share of 
portfolio flows higher in Asia than in Latin America, it is also likely to come 
from more stable sources. Pension funds and insurance companies often limit 
their investment to those countries which have been assigned investment-grade 
credit ratings by rating agencies such as Moody’s  and Standard & Poor’s. 
Currently, only Chile and Colombia in Latin America carry the investment 
grade stipulated by the portfolio allocation guidelines of pension funds, while 
in Asia the grade is enjoyed by China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, 
and Thailand. This explains why 4.6 percent assets of UK pension funds (for 
which such a breakdown is available) had by 1993 been invested in Asia, 
compared to only 0.6 percent in Latin America. 
• A third difference in the composition of capital flows is that lending classified 
as “long-term” by the IMF constitutes a fifth of Asia’s gross inflows while it 
has been negative in Latin America, thanks to Brady-type debt reduction and 
limited new lending. On the other hand, Latin American firms and banks 
tapped short-term borrowing facilities slightly more than was done by the 
borrowers from Asia. 
The fact that it is difficult in practice to distinguish between permanent and 
temporary capital inflows confronts the policy-maker in the recipient country with a 
specific transfer problem. He has to make the basic decision whether to accept or 
resist the capital inflow [Williamson (1994)], or how much to accept and how much 
to resist. (A third possibility is to induce a transfer, as Mexico did in 1994, by 
offering dollar-linked short-term government paper and by selling foreign exchange 
reserves to defend the exchange rate as investor confidence started to wane.) 
Table 2 shows that on average both regions accepted around half of the 
transfer accomplished by a current account deficit in the balance of payments,  while 
the other half went into the build-up of foreign exchange reserves. But the regional 
averages hide important country differences. In Asia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand accepted most of the inflows by running current account deficits; in Latin  
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America, Mexico, Argentina, and Peru belong to this group. By contrast, Malaysia 
and Chile have resisted most of the transfer by building up foreign exchange 
reserves (and sterilising them–see below). 
Table 2 
External Financing of Major Capital Flow Recipients, Avg. 1989-94 
in Percent of GDP 
  Current 
Account 
Deficit 












+      (4) 
China –0.5  0.8  2.6  –2.3 
India 1.5  0.8  0.2  2.1 
Indonesia 2.3  0.8  1.2  1.9 
Korea, South  0.0  0.4  0.3  0.1 
Malaysia 2.6  6.4  6.9  2.1 
Philippines 4.2  1.8  1.1  4.9 
Thailand 5.8  3.2  2.3  6.7 
Avg. Asia  2.3  2.0  2.1  2.2 
Argentina 1.5  0.6  1.7  0.4 
Brazil –0.1  1.1  0.3  0.7 
Chile 0.7  3.6  2.5  1.8 
Colombia 0.4  1.5  1.5  0.4 
Mexico 5.3  0.3  1.4  4.2 
Peru 3.3  2.4  0.3  5.4 
Avg. Latin America  1.4  1.5  1.3  1.6 
Sources:  J. P. Morgan, Emerging Markets Economic Outlook, December 16, 1994; World Bank, World 
Debt Tables 1994; own calculations. 
 
3. MACROECONOMIC PRE-REQUISITES AND  
    THE USE OF CAPITAL FLOWS 
  The choice whether to accept or to resist the transfer should not only be guided 
by the composition and volatility of capital flows but also by two different economic 
theories. The first is the sequencing literature which recommends linking the 
acceptance of capital inflows to the progress in fiscal and monetary stabilisation, 
domestic financial liberalisation, prudential   supervision, and trade liberalisation 
[Edwards (1990); Fischer and Reisen (1993)]. Fiscal consolidation is a necessary 
pre-requisite because it obviates the temptation to finance unsustainable budget  




deficits a bit longer, thanks to inflows; and because regular tax revenues obviate the 
need for governments to rely on the implicit taxation of domestic financial 
intermediation. Low inflation and inflationary expectations prior to heavy capital 
inflows obviate the temptation to use the exchange rate regime (a nominal peg, an 
active crawl, or a pure float) to help speed up the disinflationary process with heavy 
capital inflows: the costs of misallocation involved in the inevitable real currency 
appreciation, which is due to inertial inflation, are largely documented [Fischer and 
Reisen (1993)]. The risk that capital flows are skewed towards non-tradables is also 
increased by the extent of price distortions in the local economy; to avoid 
“immiserising” capital inflows [Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977)], domestic 
financial liberalisation, trade liberalisation, and solid export diversification had 
better precede a period of heavy capital inflows. Strict regulatory and supervisory 
policies are important to minimising moral hazard (including corruption, fraud, and 
excessive risk-taking) in the banking system and to ensuring the health and viability 
of domestic banks. Another important pre-requisite, not emphasised enough in the 
sequencing debate, is a high domestic savings ratio. Otherwise, to the extent that 
capital inflows stimulate domestic investment (as they should), countries risk 
running too quickly into a balance-of-payments constraint. 
Table 3 shows that Asia (in particular East Asia) and Latin America 
differed with respect to the macroeconomic pre-requisites for capital inflows to 
raise efficiency and growth without compromising stability. First, with fragile 
public finances, Latin America has relied in the past on inflationary finance 
much more than Asia, as witnessed by seigniorage as a percentage of the GDP 
during the 1970s and the 1980s. While most of the heavy capital importers had 
reduced their budget deficits by the early 1990s, at least India and Brazil did not 
fulfil the fiscal requirements for sustainable capital inflows according to the size 
of their budget deficits, and the Philippines looked fragile for the relative size of 
her public debt. Second, again in striking contrast, the heavy capital flows of the 
1990s have raised inflation levels in Asia, while capital flows have gone along 
with falling inflation levels in Latin America, thanks to heavy real appreciation 
of currencies. Third, prior to the 1990 flows, black market premia in Latin 
America have largely exceeded those in Asia, indicating a higher anti-export bias 
and the risk of immiserising capital inflows in Latin America. Export promotion 
has been more deeply anchored in Asia than in Latin America, as witnessed by 
the much more dynamic export growth; again this may indicate that the damage 
done to the diversification and fostering of exportable production, when volatile 
real exchange rates undermine the confidence in the government’s commitment 
for active trade promotion, is much greater in Latin America than in (East) Asia. 
A final striking difference is the level of gross domestic savings. In Asia, they 
are mostly solidly in the 30-plus range as a percentage of the GDP; in Latin 
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% of GDP 
Avg. Black Market 
Premium 
Post-trade Reform 








% of GDP 
China n.a.  –2.6  n.a.  88.0  11.9  33 
India 1.5  –7.4  45  23.8  5.9  24 
Indonesia 1.4 –0.6  39 8.9  5.6  37 
Korea, South  1.6  0.5  22  3.0  11.9  36 
Malaysia 1.3  –3.7  58  0.0 11.3  33 
Philippines 1.0  –3.3  96  4.6  3.7  20 
Thailand 1.0 3.3  16  1.2 14.7  34 
Avg. Asia  1.3        9.3  31 
Argentina 4.2 –5.9  22  12.1  2.2  19 
Brazil 2.3  –46.9  40  51.7  5.0  24 
Chile 3.7  2.0  18  16.1  5.5  28 
Colombia 2.1 –0.4  22  12.9  12.9  24 
Mexico 3.1  –3.2  32  10.3 1.6  20 
Peru 3.6  –4.0  42  11.5  2.5  17 
Avg. Latin 
America 
2.9        22 
Memo: Pakistan  2.0  –7.4    7.7  4.3  14 
Sources: Seigniorage: Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994); Govt. data: J. P. Morgan, Emerging Markets Outlook, Dec. 1994; Black Market Premium: Dean, 
Desai and Riedel (1994); Exports: World Bank, WDR 1994; Savings: World Bank, World Tables, 1994.  
 
   
America they are far below. Note the important country outliers within the two 
regions (Chile, Philippines), though. 
The second body of theory on which to base the decision whether to resist or 
to accept inflows is derived from the mechanics of the debt cycle. The mobilisation 
of external savings has been the classic role for capital flows to developing 
countries, where the relative capital shortage should offer higher returns than in the 
developed world.
1 According to the debt cycle hypothesis, rarely validated 
empirically, external savings raise domestic investment and growth, which in turn 
stimulates savings which eventually contribute to the elimination of net foreign debt. 
Such virtuous circle hides five requirements, again rarely complied with in practice 
[Devlin et al. (1994)]: 
  −  First,  external  capital  flows  should  consistently  augment  investment,        
rather than being diverted to consumption. 
  −  Second, the investment must be efficient. 
  −  Third, the country must invest in tradables (rather than construction and 
other non-tradables) in order to be able to create a trade surplus to 
accommodate the subsequent switch in the transfers required to service the 
debt. 
  −  Fourth, an aggressive domestic savings effort is called for, with the 
marginal savings rate exceeding the country’s average savings rate. 
  −  Fifth, the virtuous circle requires capital exporters willing to provide stable 
and predictable flows at terms which are in line with the recipient 
country’s factor productivity.  
Table 4 shows that generally the ingredients for the virtuous circle of capital 
flows are more likely to be found in Asia than in Latin America, with the 
confirmation of the often–made observation that Chile and the Philippines should 
change places. Other than in the Philippines, the Asian capital importers did not 
divert external savings into higher consumption (shares of the GDP). In particular in 
India, Indonesia, and Thailand, the private sector responded to inflows by 
augmenting investment (shares of the GDP), and in Malaysia and again Thailand, 
government consumption was considerably reduced in the wake of capital inflows. 
By contrast, the Latin American capital importers did divert the flows on aggregate 
into higher consumption shares, with the exception of Chile and Colombia. In 
Mexico and Peru, private consumption boomed, and in Argentina and Brazil 
government consumption was raised by more than four percentage points of the  
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1While the conventional neoclassical proposition suggests that capital will flow from capital-rich 
to capital-poor countries, the new growth theory strips the investor of the essential motive to move capital 
to capital-poor countries if the returns to capital are nearly constant (and not decreasing in the capital-
labour ratio as predicted by neoclassical theory). For more, see Krugman (1993). Table 4 
 
Macroeconomic Adjustment to Capital Inflows, Asia and Latin America 
% of GNP, Avg. 89-93 vs. Avg. 85-89 















China  –1.5 0.1 n.a.  11.5  2.4 
India  –4.2 –0.3 12.5  6.0  3.2 
Indonesia –4.3  –0.6  n.a.  7.0  13.2 
Korea,  South  –0.7 0.5  12.8 8.0  5.6 
Malaysia 2.0  –1.7  n.a.  8.6  8.6 
Philippines 1.8 1.4  10.6 4.7  12.1 
Thailand  –3.7 –1.8 19.3  8.5  15.7 
Avg.  Asia  –1.5 –0.3 13.8    
Argentina –1.1 4.3 3.6 5.8  3.4 
Brazil  –2.3 4.0 n.a. 4.3  6.4 
Chile  0.0  –1.7 8.6 6.3  6.7 
Colombia –0.3 0.5 8.2 4.8  5.2 
Mexico  3.6 0.2 9.6 3.1  16.5 
Peru  7.7 –1.7  9.7 12.7  15.0 
Avg. Latin America  1.2  0.5  8.8     
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Emerging Markets Investor, March 1995; J. P. Morgan, Emerging Markets Outlook, December 1994; UN, 
National Accounts. 
 




GDP. These findings imply that Latin America, unlike Asia, did not raise the 
marginal savings rate above the average savings rate when capital flows rolled in. 
While  since  1988  investment  efficiency,  as  measured  by  incremental                                         
capital output ratios, is reported by the Group of Thirty (1994) as “quite   
comparable” for the two regions, investment and growth rates have been 
considerably higher in Asia than in Latin America. Machinery and equipment 
investment, rather than construction investment, has not only been shown to explain 
importantly long-run growth performance, i.e., growth rates [De Long and Summers 
(1991)], but it is also more likely investment in tradables necessary for later debt 
service. Table 4 displays a striking difference for the two regions here, with 
equipment investment averaging 13.8 percent of the GDP over the 1989-91 in Asia, 
compared to just 8.8 percent in Latin America. The analysis thus gives grounds for 
scepticism whether the Philippines (in Asia) and Latin America (except Chile and 
Colombia) have used the recent inflows in a way that will sustainably foster growth 
and development. 
Table 5 points to a final striking regional difference in the use and effects of 
capital inflows. In Asia, inflation levels generally increased (with the mild exception 
of Malaysia and the Philippines), reflecting the reluctance of policy-makers to 
accommodate capital inflows with an upward float of the exchange rate and the 
subsequent incapacity to fully control domestic monetary aggregates. In Latin 
America, Argentina, Mexico, and Peru used exchange rate policy and capital flows 
to rapidly lower inflation levels; Argentina and Mexico anchored the exchange rate 
and inflation expectations at the US dollar, while Peru followed the domestic 
monetarist approach (as did the Philippines). The real exchange rate, comparing the 
exchange rate-adjusted rise in local consumer prices relative to the United States, 
appreciated over the 1990s by almost 70 percent in Argentina and by more than 20 
percent in the Philippines, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. The real exchange 
rate is an important relative price for determining the relative consumption of and 
investment in tradables versus non-tradables. The real exchange rate thus helps 
predict  future problems, to generate a trade surplus. It does not, however, indicate 
changes in current external competitiveness which are better denoted by the real 
effective exchange rate. The latter indicator is an index of the country’s trade-
weighted average value against the currencies of its principal trading partners, 
adjusted for relative price changes based on indexes most closely measuring the 
prices of domestically produced finished manufactured goods. With exchange-rate-
based disinflation, or with a nominal appreciation of the exchange rate, producer 
prices generally fall more rapidly than do consumer prices, which include non-
tradables not exposed to world market competition. Another reason is often the 
consolidation of government budgets implying withdrawal of various subsidies that  
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   FX Regime 
 
Annual CPI Inflation 
Dec.-Dec. 
92-94 








China Adjustable  peg  8.8-27.0  75.9  n.a. 
India Adjustable  peg  8.0-9.4  75.7 78.7 
Indonesia  Passive crawling peg  5.0-10.0  105.3  97.0 
Korea, South  Managed peg  4.5-6.3  101.6  82.0 
Malaysia Managed  peg 4.9-4.2 108.9  106.2 
Philippines Managed  floating  8.2-7.8  126.9  103.2 
Thailand   Managed peg  3.0-4.6  111.4  98.4 
Argentina Currency  board  17.5-3.4  168.8  107.2 
Brazil  Passive crawling peg  1149-936  130.5  105.4 
Chile Target  zone  12.7-9.0  119.0  115.1 
Colombia Managed  floating  25.1-22.0 133.9  119.5 
Mexico  Active crawling peg  11.9-7.0  122.2  111.6 
Peru Floating  56.7-16.0  122.0 96.4 
Source: IMF,  International Financial Statistics; Emerging Markets Investor, November 1994.  
 
   
enter the consumer price index but not the producer price index. Finally, any 
productivity surges will be reflected in falling producer prices, but not immediately 
in falling consumer prices. The real effective exchange rate has nowhere appreciated 
more than twenty percent over the 1990s, quite in contrast to earlier experiences in 
the Southern Cone of  Latin America. Note, however, that the relative competitive 
position has deteriorated in Colombia, Chile, and Mexico but, thanks to 
discretionary devaluation, improved in China and India. 
Table 6 summarises the discussion in this section, possibly involving more a 
personal judgement than a picture to be comfortable with. Nevertheless, the serious 
lack of pre-requisites for massive capital inflows as stipulated by the sequencing 
literature, the failure to use funds in a way that would be consistent with a smooth 
passage through the debt cycle, and a massive appreciation of the relative price for 
non-tradables should be cause for concern. In Mexico and Argentina, this has 





Requirements Derived from 
the Sequencing Literature 











China  No  n.a.  Yes  1 or 2 
India No  Yes  Yes  1 
Indonesia Yes  Yes  Yes  0 
Korea, South  Yes  Yes  Yes  0 
Malaysia Yes  Yes  Yes  0 
Philippines No  No  No  3 
Thailand Yes  Yes  Yes  0 
Argentina No  No  No  3 
Brazil No  No  Yes  2 
Chile Yes  Yes  Yes  0 
Colombia Yes  Yes  No  1 
Mexico No  No  No  3 
Peru No  No  No  3 
 
4.  POLICY LESSONS OF THE 1990s FOR THE 
 NEXT EPISODE OF HEAVY INFLOWS 
As a result of monetary tightening in the OECD area, still in a relatively early 
phase (in early 1995), net capital flows to the emerging markets will fall appreciably 
in 1995 and stay low through 1996. But there will be the next recession in the OECD  




area, say from 1997 on, and falling asset returns and interest rates in the OECD 
countries will not fail to push heavy flows of cyclical money into the emerging 
markets again. This section aims at drawing advice from recent experiences, for the 
use of finance ministries and central banks, on how to proceed in dealing with the 
supply of temporary capital.  
 
 Identify the Nature of the Shocks 
Let us assume that the authorities first observe a rise in foreign exchange 
reserves. Such rise must not necessarily be due to a flattening of the supply-side 
curve of foreign capital. Frankel (1994) has recently analysed three different sources 
of the disturbance, i.e., the rise in foreign exchange reserves within the traditional 
IS/LM framework. He distinguishes three sources of rising foreign exchange 
reserves: 
  (i)  An improvement in the trade balance, caused by prior devaluation, as in     
the Colombian case of the early 1990s  and now to be experienced in 
Mexico. Improving terms of trade or superior productivity growth may 
also cause reserve inflows through a trade balance surplus. 
  (ii)   A domestic monetary disturbance, which can be either a contraction in 
domestic money supply or an increase in the demand for money, which 
could be in response to a domestic exchange-rate-based stabilisation 
programme.  
  (iii)  Finally, the focus of attention in this paper, the foreign exchange reserves 
may rise as a result of a drop in external interest rates and asset returns, as 
happened in the OECD area at the start of the 1990s.  
Frankel (1994) shows convincingly that an attempt to discern the nature of the 
disturbance is likely to be most useful in deciding the appropriate macroeconomic 
response. An improvement of the trade balance that tends to persist will appreciate 
the real exchange, either through nominal appreciation of the currency or through 
monetary accommodation. When the underlying cause of the trade imbalance is the 
excess of domestic spending over production, as in the United States, the trade 
balance can only be restored by adjusting private or public spending through 
changing savings, budget deficits or investment.  
When a rise in foreign exchange reserves results from an increase in the 
demand for money, the optimal response is monetary accommodation to that rise in 
the demand. A sterilisation attempt would entail needlessly high interest rates and a 
contraction of economic activity. When the shock originates in domestic monetary 
contraction, the optimal response is very much governed by the country’s degree of  
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financial openness. A completely open economy will only allow the option to let the 
currency float upwards if monetary contraction is to be sustained. But restrictions on 
short-term inflows open the option to avoid nominal appreciation and to sterilise 
capital inflows in order to keep the money supply on target. 
The final case is that of an exogenous fall in world interest rates. The 
resulting capital inflows cause the domestic currency to appreciate in real terms, 
unless there is sterilised intervention on the foreign exchange market. The nominal 
exchange rate appreciates when it is flexible, as in Peru and the Philippines; the 
domestic price level rises when the nominal rate is pegged, as happened in Hong 
Kong over the early 1990s. With either fully floating or pegged exchange rates, the 
real exchange rate appreciation resides in the failure of the monetary authorities to 
supply the mix of assets which foreign and domestic investors are now demanding . 
The authorities do nothing in the floating-rate case; they issue money in exchange 
for foreign assets in the pegged-rate case; they should issue bonds instead, by 
engaging in sterilised intervention [Kenen (1993)]. Sterilised intervention of the 
1990s inflows has been practised most aggressively in Chile and Malaysia, as 
indicated in Chart 2. The chart measures the degree to which both countries 
sterilised by relating foreign exchange reserves to money; money is defined as 
M1(and not as the monetary base) because the latter aggregate is affected by how the 
sterilisation is carried out [Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod (1994)]. 
Identify the Limits of  Foreign Indebtedness 
Only very rough rules of thumb are available to set a prudent limit of the size 
of capital flows that can be accepted [Williamson (1994)]. While in 1994 many 
observers started to realise that Mexico’s current account deficit was reaching a level 
that would be unsustainable (8 percent of GDP), there was no theory behind such 
observation. In practice, the intertemporal budget constraint does not help, because 
many poor countries have been allowed to run deficits for an almost unlimited time-
period. Some capital flows, such as foreign direct investment inflows, are less 
vulnerable to withdrawal and are not debt-creating; but they cannot be fully ignored 
either, since they also generate a need for foreign exchange earnings to service 
remittances. Economists therefore, when asked to assess prudent limits for current 
account deficits, tend to concur with a debt-dynamics equation: 
dt  =  dt–1 (i
* –  n)   +   ct   … … … … …     (1) 
where the debt/GDP ratio rises when the interest rate on existing debt, i*, exceeds 
the GDP growth, n, or by the amount of the current account deficit as a fraction of 
the GDP, ct. The relevant interest rate here is the effective rate, which is the 
weighted average across all kinds of debt, creditors, and currency denominations.  
 




Equity-related inflows can be incorporated in principle, by giving them lower weight 
in the effective interest rate. 
A prudent limit for current account deficits can be derived from here. It is 
obvious that the size of the sustainable deficit depends very much on the effective 
interest rate and on the country’s growth rate. With more concessional flows or 
equity-related inflows, a bigger deficit ratio can be sustained; the same holds for a 
high-growth country. An often-quoted rule of thumb [Williamson (1994)] for the 
debt/GDP ratio is that it should not exceed 40 percent. Once the country has reached 
that level, the current account as a fraction of the GDP should prudently not (at least 
for long) exceed the difference between its growth rate and the effective interest rate. 
Here we have a major difference between, say, Mexico and Thailand, whose current 
account deficit also reached 8 percent of the GDP in 1994. Table 7 gives a stylised 
account of that difference, assuming a debt/GDP ratio of 40 percent (which, in fact, 
has been reached in both countries). 
Table 7 demonstrates that there is nothing automatically unsustainable about a 
country running a high current account deficit relative to the GDP, as long as it is 
matched by a high growth rate. Likewise, a low-income country such as Pakistan 
can run a higher deficit on its current account than Mexico, even when its growth 




The Sustainable Current Account Deficit and the GDP Growth 































Mexico 6.7  3.0  4.5  0.8 
Thailand 6.9  3.0  8.5  4.6 
Source: World  Bank,  World Debt Tables 1994-95; own calculations. 
aAssumed. 
bOn debt-creating flows, with no increase in the debt/GDP ratio. 
 
Discourage Above-limit Short-term Inflows 
Capital market failures can call for direct measures to discourage capital 
inflows. In particular, developing-country borrowers are faced with a supply curve  
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of foreign savings that is horizontal until a certain net debt position (the level of 
which is unknown ex ante), but which at some point turns steeply upward. As Chile 
experienced in the early 1980s and Mexico did recently, private market participants 
do not internalise the social cost of their borrowings abroad [Harberger (1985)]. That 
market failure, not unlike the congestion externality in road traffic, justifies capital 
controls on short-term inflows, such as a tax on short-term external credits. The 
underlying paradigm is that the monetary authorities (a) pursue longer-term 
objectives than do private agents operating in financial markets, and (b) that they are 
better informed about future macroeconomic trends and their long-term effects on 
the economy [Zahler (1992)]. Before resorting to capital controls, however, the 
monetary authorities should eliminate any remaining subsidies to inward investment, 
such as free deposit insurance [Williamson (1994)]. 
One cannot be dogmatic about the benefits of having completely unrestricted 
capital flows; even the major market participants agree. As J. P. Morgan notes in the 
latest Emerging Markets Economic Outlook (March 17,1995): “Most countries in 
Asia explicitly restrict short-term inflows and limit foreign borrowing by residents. 
The two most successful economies in Latin America–Chile and Colombia–do 
likewise” (p.12). 
Chile, after having phased out the subsidies provided to inward investment by 
debt-equity swaps, imposed a 20 percent reserve requirement against foreign 
holdings of bank deposits, and it was raised to 30 percent in 1992. Further, a tax of 
1.2 percent was imposed on short-term external credits. Colombia imposed a 3 
percent tax on transfers from abroad in 1991. Malaysia reimposed foreign exchange 
control measures in early 1994, limiting banks’ holdings of foreign funds that were 
not trade-related or intended for investment in plant, equipment, or inventory stocks; 
Thai mutual funds have been prohibited from purchasing non-Thai assets; even 
Singapore prohibits short or long Singapore $ positions unless the documentation 
can be produced for the underlying trade transaction, and portfolio controls still 
apply to Singaporean financial institutions; Korea and Taiwan have never lifted 
certain foreign exchange controls–Taiwan, in fact, placed a ceiling on foreign 
holdings of listed Taiwanese shares [Reisen and Yéches (1993); Glick and Moreno 
(1994) and Greenwood (1994)]. Asia also restricts equity inflows more than Latin 
America, again with the exception of Chile. Table 8 confirms the restrictedness of 
Asian stock markets by comparing the regions’ global market weights (IFC global 
index) with those where foreigners are free to invest (IFC investible index). 
Foreign exchange controls, however, have their well publicised drawbacks. 
First, if they could be enforced effectively, they would do so at the cost of 
interfering with the international integration of financial markets; such interference  
 




invites misallocation of resources because the country’s residents face other prices 
and returns (generally, lower) for a given asset than do people elsewhere, and 
because the controls may preclude the benefits (important in poor countries) of 
consumption smoothing. Second, the effectiveness of capital controls tends to erode 
over time since people find ways to evade them, which in turn risks to trigger an 
ever tighter net of capital controls imposed by the authorities.         
Table 8 
Stock Market Investibility, 1993 
  Stock Market Weights (%) within Emerging Markets 
   Global  Investible 
Asia 63.7  42.5 
Latin America  31.1  48.8 
 –  Chile  3.5  1.6 
Other Emerging  5.4  8.7 
Source: IFC, Emerging Markets Factbook 1994. 
 
Observe the Trade-off between Price Stability and Competitiveness 
In February 1993. Former Mexican President Carlos Salinas said to Business 
Week [as quoted in Dornbusch and Werner (1994)]: 
“We must bring inflation down to a one-digit level this year. Some say, ‘Why 
don’t you relax your inflation goals a bit so we can have better growth rates?’ 
And I respond: There is no trade-off between inflation and growth.” 
This has been shown to be a dangerous proposition.
2 The growth costs of 
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2It should be noted that Mr Salinas’s proposition was explicitly supported by the OECD (1992) in 
its first Mexico Survey: “…the conditions are nearly in place for a hardening of the exchange rate 
commitment to one of keeping a stable parity rather than letting the rate crawl: public finances are under 
control, export performance is good, and inflation is moving towards a rate where the differential vis-à-vis 
the United States could be appropriate for a rapidly developing economy with rising relative prices of non-
tradables” (p. 183). My own reading of Mexico’s situation begged to differ already then [Reisen (1993)]: 
“…some countries–notably Mexico, Argentina and Peru– are heavily dependent on short-term capital 
inflows vulnerable to quick reversal in the event of change in investor sentiment. Note that the structure 
and maturity of capital inflows depend on the exchange rate regime. As long as a peg to, say, the US dollar 
is credible, it allows investors to exploit nominal domestic-foreign interest rate differentials in short-term 
interest rates; the peg is apt to raise the “hot money” share in capital inflows (p. 131) …Mexico’s recent 
experience points to the considerable risks of exchange rate-based disinflation. The country enjoyed 
exceptionally favourable circumstances for pegging the currency to the dollar: long-established fiscal 
balance, supportive income policies, a cheap dollar in PPP terms, and an initially undervalued peso. If 
even in Mexico inflationary inertia is sufficiently high to translate the active crawling peg into substantial 
real exchange rate appreciation, the peg is unlikely to work in other poor countries.” (p. 142). 
  
 
   
immoderate inflation levels should not blind us to the complication of getting to low 
inflation. But little support can be derived from Mr Salinas’s faulty analysis for the 
popular Mexican saying: “The problem is not the tipo de cambio but the cambio de 
tipo.” The choice of the exchange rate regime is crucial, when inertial inflation 
causes a trade-off between a domestic inflation target and a target for the real 
exchange rate.  
What should be done when stabilisation of the domestic price level does not 
precede an open capital account? It is tempting for the monetary authority to either 
let the currency purely float in order to control monetary aggregates or to resort to 
exchange rate-based disinflation by means of an active crawl or by means of a 
currency-board arrangement. Although theoretically elegant, such exchange-rate 
regimes carry considerable risks of generating an unsustainable overvaluation as a 
result of volatile capital flows. 
The complication for exchange rate management arises because inflation 
tends to be built into expectations, via implicit (or even explicit) indexation in goods 
and labour markets. This makes goods prices and labour costs sticky, while financial 
markets tend to be forward-looking. This asymmetry between the labour market and 
financial markets raises stabilisation costs by producing real exchange rate 
overshooting. If the government which wants to bring down inflation firmly believes 
in domestic monetarism, as it did in New Zealand from 1984 to 1988 and recently in 
Peru, it will dismantle controls and opt for a clean float. With a clean float of the 
exchange rate and no capital controls,  the effectiveness of monetary policy is 
enhanced by both domestic demand (tight credit) and foreign demand (strong 
currency). However, the effectiveness of monetary policy has an immediate and 
often persistent cost in terms of external competitiveness [Joumard and Reisen 
(1992)].  
In developing countries, exchange rate pegs translate easily into overvalued 
real exchange rates. Capital inflows tend to be powerless to arbitrate away large 
interest rate differentials vis-à-vis industrial countries. To be sure, interest rates 
embody country risks (higher than in the OECD countries) and real overvaluation 
fuels the exchange risk premium. But there are institutional factors, too, which 
explain the much-observed lack of interest rate convergence towards world levels 
[Fischer (1993)]. 
With positive nominal interest rate differentials against the world financial 
markets (reflecting microeconomic causes or the ongoing stabilisation effort), a 
credible peg can induce excessive portfolio inflows, which easily exceed the 
sterilisation capacity of the central bank. The resulting excess demand can, in 
principle, be eliminated by fiscal or income restraint. In many developing (and some 
industrial) countries, however, the opposite is likely to happen because excessive  




inflows tend to undermine support for restrictive policies. When exchange rate pegs 
help to bring down inflation, the disinflation performance is often unsustainable 
[Larrain and Reisen (1994)]. Exchange rate-based disinflation starts to succeed once 
the implied overvaluation dampens domestic wages and prices, helped by growing 
unemployment and appreciation. The correction of excess unemployment and 
overvaluation will imply a return to higher levels of inflation. It is thus wise not to 
be overambitious and single-minded with inflation targets in the low-level single-
digit rate when capital flows in. The experiences in the early 1980s and 1990s in 
much of Latin America and Asia provide a case for targeting money and real 
exchange rates simultaneously. The main instrument to achieve both targets 
simultaneously is the sterilised intervention of temporary capital inflows.   
Sterilise Net Capital Inflows
3 
When the rise of foreign exchange reserves is identified to originate abroad, 
central banks are advised to absorb such rises (to resist nominal appreciation), while 
simultaneously reducing domestic credit in order to avoid an inflationary increase in 
the money supply. As the Mexican authorities learned in 1994, sterilised intervention 
is an asymmetric policy which provides useful short-term relief in the case of 
excessive inflows  but is rapidly ineffective in the case of outflows when foreign 
exchange reserves rapidly fall to zero. Sterilised intervention will also be more 
effective in coping with excessive inflows when it is supported by other policy 
instruments. Many economists are dismissive of sterilised intervention, however.  
First, while there is agreement among economists that non-sterilised 
intervention (just as any other monetary policy) can affect nominal exchange rates, 
the effectiveness of sterilised intervention is much more controversial. Changing the 
composition of central bank assets without changing their aggregate size, it is often 
argued, cannot be an effective policy to influence the relative price between two 
monies. Such agnosticism ignores the portfolio-balance channel; in the case of 
capital inflows, the corresponding rise in the central bank’s net foreign assets will be 
sterilised by a rising supply of domestic-currency bonds. If domestic and foreign 
bonds are imperfect substitutes (due to currency or sovereign risk), investors will 
require a higher expected return on domestic bonds to hold their larger outstanding 
stock; the currency will tend to depreciate. Casual observation suggests that the 
portfolio-balance channel can be exploited by developing-country authorities. 
Uncovered interest parity does not hold, and there exists a stable relationship 
between domestic government debt and the domestic-foreign interest differential.  
A second objection to sterilised intervention, particularly raised in the Latin  
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3For an extensive discussion of sterilised intervention in developing countries, see Frankel (1994) 
and Reisen (1994).  
 
   
American context [Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993)], stems from the alleged 
fiscal costs, this objection is based on two arguments: (a) To dampen the 
appreciation, the central bank typically has to swap low-yield foreign exchange for 
high-yield domestic bonds; the accumulated interest differential can become an 
important fiscal (or quasi-fiscal) burden. (b) Sterilised intervention deprives the 
government of a reduction in its debt-service burden by preventing the decline in the 
domestic interest rate that normally accompanies a capital inflow. Both arguments 
are unlikely to hold in present value terms if the capital inflow and exchange rate 
appreciation are correctly assessed as temporary:  
  −  With risk premiums in domestic interest rates sufficiently small, the short-
term fiscal losses derived from swapping low-yield foreign exchange for 
high-yield domestic bonds should be partly offset by a subsequent capital 
gain derived from the appreciation of foreign exchange reserves. The 
central bank, like Friedman’s stabilising speculator, should make money 
by buying dollars when they are cheap (in peso terms) and by selling 
dollars when they are dear. 
  −  While it is true that sterilised intervention prevents a decline in interest 
rates that normally accompanies a capital inflow, it does not follow that 
alternative exchange rate regimes would compare favourably in the longer 
run. Sterilised intervention aims at dampening real exchange rate 
overshooting. This implies less real appreciation of the exchange rate first, 
and less real depreciation back to the equilibrium rate later. Interest parity 
requires a corresponding move in real interest rates: with sterilised 
intervention, the lower real appreciation entails a comparatively higher 
level of real interest rates which is then offset by a comparatively lower 
interest rate level when the currency depreciates. 
Third, developing countries may experience practical problems with sterilised 
intervention due to underdeveloped domestic securities markets [Fischer and Reisen 
(1992)]. Lack of government debt paper (which is often the case in Asian countries) 
forces central banks to issue obligations of their own, swelling central bank 
liabilities relative to the monetary base. Putting pressure on the refinancing schedule 
of central bank liabilities, sterilised intervention can endanger future control of the 
monetary base. In such cases, most Asian central banks do not shy away from 
(sometimes mandated) transactions to manipulate the flow of liquidity into the 
banking system in response to external capital flows. They often swap government 
excess savings (originating, say, in social security funds or public enterprises) held 
with banks into (and out of ) government bonds [Reisen (1993)]. This practice can 
be considered as a generalised form of sterilised intervention. It should be noted that 
the approach relies on the existence of public-sector savings, and hence on “fiscal 
complicity”.  




Sound government finances are also a precondition for a more activist fiscal 
policy for managing the domestic demand, implying a macro effect and a 
composition effect [Corbo and Hernandez (1994)]. By tightening government 
consumption, the interest rate can be lowered and some of the capital inflows 
attracted by positive interest differentials choke off. The composition effect also 
helps to avoid an appreciation of the real exchange rate as most of government 
consumption tends to be spent on the non-tradable service sector. 
Another possibility is to respond to capital inflows by raising the reserve 
requirements on the banking system. Rising reserve ratios, however, drive a wedge 
between lending rates (which rise) and savings returns (which drop) and diminish 
the efficiency of the financial system as borrowers are diverted to lenders, who may 
escape such reserve requirements [Williamson (1994)]. 
Even the Hong Kong Monetary Authority has gradually introduced more 
instruments for monetary control, such as open market operations in bills and bonds, 
a liquidity adjustment facility, and a variable reserve requirement imposed on the 
major note-issuing bank. “As a result, the Hong Kong currency board is no longer a 
textbook example of a passive agency issuing and redeeming notes on demand but 
much more akin to an activist central bank” [Greenwood (1994), p. 7]. Those who 
advised Mexico in early 1995 to switch to a currency-board system should take 
notice.  
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1. 
Professor Reisen’s lecture, on a matter of current relevance and concern, is 
indeed useful. 
Underlying the problems posed by short-term capital flows is the changed 
international monetary system, often referred to as the non-system. Frequently used 
concepts remain vague and of little help in formulating and guiding policy. To take 
an example, a recent IMF document explains significant misalignment as a situation 
where “exchange rates are divorced from economic fundamentals or reflect 
inappropriate or unsustainable policies”. This explanation only causes one to reflect 
further: for example, how do we judge a policy or a set of policies to be 
inappropriate or unsustainable? Rudiger Dornbusch adopts a more operationally 
useful approach: misalignment, he says, is a situation when a country tries to fight 
inflation with an exchange rate policy. Thus, the usefulness of Helmut Reisen’s 
paper lies in his efforts to clarify some of these concepts.  
I do not particularly wish to reopen yesterday’s discussion on whether the 
IMF is a strong or a weak institution, but I would like to mention, en passant, that 
historically the IMF has had little to do with the exchange rate policies of the 
industrial countries; for example, it had no role in the Plaza or Louvre accords on 
exchange rate arrangements. At one time, Peru too refused to declare a par value. Its 
recent decision to accept what are perhaps weak promises made by Russia dilute its 
monetary character and point to its ongoing transformation into a development 
finance institution. One could of course find other instances of the gap between the 
IMF’s mandate and its actions. That is not the point. The point is that the IMF, to 
borrow some words from Barry Eichengreen and Peter Kenen, was less an enforcer 
of rules than a repository of understanding on which international monetary 
collaboration has rested. 
The term “non-system” refers to the emergence of private global financial 
markets. This has fundamentally altered the reality that the IMF was intended to 
manage. Promoting exchange rate stability and adjustment are still the IMF’s goals, 
but the institution lacks the resources and the power to pursue these goals.  
The global financial markets (the non-system) are capricious in their 
behaviour. Markets display a delayed response or they overshoot: though a situation 
takes time to build up, access to credit is denied abruptly and suddenly; and credit is 
not restored even well after the stabilisation and adjustment policies have been put in 
place. Asymmetry characterises the extent of difficulties posed by currency 
appreciation  vis-à-vis currency depreciation. How do markets assess a country’s 
credit-worthiness? And do they really provide a discipline for a government’s policies? The markets offer no guide to what should be the focus of policy, i.e., 
exchange rates, or economic fundamentals, or macroeconomic policies. 
Private business involved in international trade sees exchange rate volatility 
as a matter of serious concern. The use of parity, though, in whatever manner, is 
unhelpful, and only invites bets from the markets; very large resources can be 
mobilised for the purpose. the G-3, i.e., USA, Germany, and Japan, clearly prefer to 
target policy to domestic goals. They desire policies geared to domestic objectives. 
The Europeans in EU desire greater integration. These diverse objectives make it 
very likely that any changes to the international monetary system would be 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary. There is a wide gap between the mandate of a 
national central bank and the developments that it is expected to influence.         
Governments face an inner conflict: trade is to be free but, in the interest of 
economic stability, there is a need to control international financial flows. 
The global financial markets, the non-system, do have a mechanism for 
money creation and exchange rate determination, and also appear to have their own 
informal code of conduct. But these markets operate in what is for all purposes a 
legal and institutional vacuum. The Bank for International Settlements comes closest 
to a global monetary institution of the future. Thus far, its efforts at building a 
regulatory regime seem to follow crises: the Basle Concordat of 1975 followed 
Herstatt in 1974, and its 1983 revision came in the wake of Banco Ambrisiano. 
There followed the Capital Accord of 1988, and the Basle Committee’s Minimum 
Standards for Effective Supervision were approved after the BCCI fiasco in 1992. 
The Bank for International Settlements also has committees on banking supervision 
and on payments and settlements. However, it lacks an enabling inter-governmental 
treaty. 
What could the government or the central bank action expect to achieve. This 
raises the question of whether intervention works and how well-understood is the 
relationship between the exchange rate regime and policy targets such as inflation. 
By focusing on exchange rates, and not policies, are we focusing on the symptoms 
rather than the disease? How is one to Judge, in a situation of freedom of capital 
movements, whether the exchange rate was influenced by intervention and not by 
other factors? (Was a target specified before the intervention?) The ERM was seen 
as a means of reducing volatility at inception (1979), but the focus shifted in the 
early 1980s to controlling inflation, and, more recently, the ERM is seen as part of 
the movement towards integration. Until September 1992 it had worked in all three 
areas. 
I subscribe to the Bank for International Settlements view that, broadly 
speaking, the capital inflows to East Asian economies are more nearly identifiable 
with investment and capital formation whereas the inflows to Latin American  
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particular, John Williamson recently argued that the susceptibility to a currency 
crisis seems to bear some relationship to the depth of current account deficit 
(expressed as a ratio of the GNP); and this, for example, could hypothetically place 
Thailand in a Mexico-like situation.
1 Some recent work by Michael Dooley and 
others that argues that real fungibility exists between different types of capital flows 
would, prima facie,  provide some support to John Williamson’s point of view.
2 
Actual developments in East Asia do not, however, bear out this line of reasoning.  
I also agree with Professor Reisen when he points to the ambiguity of the link 
between financial liberalisation and economic growth. Indeed, Philippines was the 
first among the East Asian countries to liberalise but is noticeably absent from the 
list of “miracle” economies.  
 
Corporate Law Authority,                                                               Faizullah Khilji 
Islamabad. 
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1John Williamson made the remark in the course of a discussion at the National Economists Club, 
Washington, D. C., March16, 1995. 
 
2See Stijn Claessens, Michael P. Dooley and Andrew Warner. “Portfolio Capital Flows: Hot or 
Cold”. The World Bank Economic Review, January 1995.  
2. 
This paper provides a topical, incisive, and well-argued warning for policy-
makers grappling with the management of capital accounts in a volatile financial 
world. 
My comments on the paper can be divided into two categories: 
  (A) The paper presented at the conference appears to be an abbreviation of a larger 
work. Certain clarifications, therefore, are required on specific points which 
seem to be muddled. 
  (B) The relevance of the paper to economies which are marked by uncertainty and 
instability. In such circumstances, the volatility of the domestic policy 
environment can be reinforced by external instability. 
(A) Clarifications 
A.1. The paper has an extremely interesting set of statistics in a table on page 
5 but no comment on it in the main text. Table 1 shows that whereas net capital 
inflow to Latin America was nearly twice as high as to Asia between 1978-82, the 
picture is reversed completely a decade later. Thus, net capital inflows to Asia were 
double those of Latin America between 1990-93. Not only does this fact deserve a 
comment in the text but also its implications need to be explored. For example, have 
the global effects of the recent Mexican crisis been mitigated by the fact that, in 
contrast to the 1980s, Latin America’s significance has declined considerably? 
While there have been knock-on effects on other emerging markets, the global 
repercussions of a similar collapse in a major Asian country could be even worse. 
A.2. There are comparative regional statements, the explanations for which 
are not evident from the text. For example, it is not clear why Foreign Direct 
Investment is going into directly productive investments for export in Asia, while it 
is financing shopping malls and other non-tradable consumption activities in Latin 
America. This trend is particularly odd in view of the history of LA’s volatility. 
A.3. One of the central messages of the paper relates to virtuous and vicious 
circles. It is argued that if you are a stable country, you attract more stable capital 
flows because you get a sound credit rating from pension funds and insurance 
companies (p. 6). On the other hand, instability attracts more volatile inflows. While 
these virtuous and vicious circles are outlined and serve a useful descriptive purpose, 
it is not clear how one moves from one to the other. Is the paper suggesting that 
sterilisation is a necessary and sufficient condition for the shift? If so, it is too strong 
a statement. If sterilisation is a necessary condition only, then what other measures 
are required for the move to a virtuous circle? This point needs to be explored 
further.   A.4. Another explanatory query relates to why foreign capital inflows had 
such a different impact on the two regions under consideration. Why did Latin 
America finance consumption through foreign borrowing with no rise in the 
marginal savings rate, while in Asia investment and savings were augmented (page 
10). 
A.5. it is stated (page 17) that a sustainable current account deficit is a 
function of the rate of growth. Surely this relationship also depends on other 
variables, in particular the degree of openness of the economy. Thus, what 
constitutes a sustainable current account deficit would depend on the trade/GDP 
ratio for any given level of the growth rate. Perhaps this point could be addressed.  
(B) Relevance to Unstable Economies 
B.1. The paper has a particular resonance for unstable countries in both Asia 
and Latin America. The point can be illustrated by the case of Pakistan, which has 
obvious relevance for this conference. When we discuss the Pakistan case, the 
comparison should not be with the stable East Asians but with other vulnerable 
countries, such as the Philippines, which have similar political and economic 
instability. Accordingly, the author’s comments on the following three points would 
be welcome.   
B.2. Pakistan has been undergoing a somewhat unstable structural adjustment 
programme since 1988. One of the primary causes of instability has been improper 
sequencing of reform. An excessively large fiscal deficit remained while the capital 
account and the financial sector were liberalised. 
The strain showed in 1992, in particular, when ill-conceived populist 
consumption schemes, such as the import of tax is, led to monetary financing of the 
deficit comparable to the Latin American situation. Borrowing from the banking 
system rose from 0.8 percent of the GDP to 6 percent of the GDP by 1991-92. Along 
with supply-side shocks in agriculture, the result has been slower growth and the 
doubling of inflation, since the start of the structural adjustment programme. The 
question is: How stable a liberalisation programme can be in such a macro 
environment, and whether the pace of reforms should be held back until the fiscal 
deficit is reduced? If this is not done, will the liberalisation not backfire and further 
accentuate instability by creating the conditions for volatility on the capital account? 
B.3. it is somewhat ironic that efforts to restore macroeconomic stability were 
undermined by capital inflows. In 1993-94, major cuts in public expenditure led to a 
lower fiscal deficit and a sharp reduction in the monetisation of the deficit. However, 
the rate of growth of the money supply was higher because of the accumulation of 
foreign exchange reserves. Thus, inflationary pressures did not subside despite better 
macro management. In these circumstances, does the real solution lie in raising the 
tax/GDP ratios and the savings rate, rather than in demand reducing sterilisation? 
426 Omar  Noman   B.4. Finally, it is particularly relevant to comment on the situation of the host 
country with regard to the conditions in its principal port and commercial city, 
Karachi. What has been the experience of countries which try and liberalise the 
capital account when debilitating domestic instability can create the conditions for 
capital flight? Should a premature entry into a vicious circle be avoided by a more 
selective and gradual liberalisation? Or are countries such as Pakistan headed 
towards the problems evident in Latin America?  
 
Omar Noman 
International Development Centre,  
Queen Elizabeth House,  
Oxford University, 
England.    
            
                                                    
   
 Comments  427 